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Bridging the Gap:
An Application of Social Frameworks
Evidence to Shaken Baby Syndrome
LAUREN QUINT*

Ever since the syndrome was first recognized in the 1960s, a diagnosis of shaken baby
syndrome ("SBS") was believed to be pathognomonic of abuse. New data calls into
question the accuracy of the diagnosis and its association with nonaccidental death.
This data points to alternative causes of brain injuries in infants and small children and
casts doubt on the validity of evidence frequently used at trial. This Note explores
problems associatedwith expert testimony in the context of SBS. It argues that despite
the ability to accurately present general causation evidence at trial, introduction of
specific causation testimony is often premature and unsupported by existing scientific
proof A careful application of John Monahan and Laurens Walker's social
frameworks theory provides the groundwork for new evidentiary techniques in the
defense and prosecution of SBS. By limiting expert testimony to that of social
frameworks, courts can encourage thorough exploration of pertinent scientific and
corroborating evidence, while simultaneously preventing inappropriate specific
causation testimony. Finally, this Note compares SBS to other crimes, such as rape and
arson, because applying lessons learned from the use of socialframeworks evidence in
other litigation contexts can help lawyers more accuratelyand equitably try SBS cases.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 20II. I would like to thank my
faculty advisor Professor David Faigman for his patience and guidance throughout this process. I
would also like to thank the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work. This Note is
dedicated to Michael Grosack, who has provided me with unwavering intellectual, emotional, and
personal support throughout law school, and to my family for their tremendous love and support.
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INTRODUCTION

Recognizing the need for improvement in the realm of forensic
evidence and the law, Congress directed the National Academy of
Sciences ("NAS") to identify the current state of forensic evidence and
to "chart an agenda for progress in the forensic science community and
its scientific disciplines."' While the resulting 2oo9 NAS report notes that
the last two decades of scientific advancement have contributed to more
effective prosecution of criminals as well as the exoneration of innocent
individuals, especially in the context of DNA evidence, the report also
discusses examples where "substantive information and testimony based
on faulty forensic science analyses" contributed to the wrongful
conviction of innocent people.' These examples illustrate that placing
undue weight on evidence produced from imperfect testing, analysis, or
testimony leads to the admission of erroneous, unduly biased, or
misleading evidence.' Despite state and federal case law guiding the use
of scientific evidence and expert testimony at trial, problems and

I. NAT'L ACAD. SC., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:

A

PATH FORWARD

xix (2009).
2. Id. at 4; see, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to
Regulate Crime Labs 166 (Case Western Reserve Univ. Sch. L., Working Paper No. o8-o2, 2oo8),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=io83735 ("The most recent study of 2oo DNA exonerations found
that forensic evidence (present in 57% of the cases) was the second leading type of evidence (after
eyewitness identifications at 79%) used in wrongful conviction cases. Pre-DNA serology of blood and
semen evidence was the most commonly used forensic technique (79 cases). Next came hair evidence
(43 cases), soil comparison (5 cases), DNA tests (3 cases), bite mark evidence (3 cases), fingerprint
evidence (2 cases), dog scent identification (2 cases), spectrographic voice evidence (I case), shoe
prints (I case), and fiber comparison (I case).") (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence,
Io8 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 81 (2oo8)).
3. NAT'L ACAD. Sd., supra note I, at xx, 4.
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misunderstandings remain. Judges, as well as defense and prosecution
attorneys, often welcome science as a tool in the courtroom. At the same
time, practical difficulties arise when increased scientific understanding
substantively undermines longstanding legal, social, or scientific
assumptions.
This Note explores some of the problems associated with expert
testimony in the context of shaken baby syndrome ("SBS"). SBS, also
referred to as abusive head trauma,' is a category of child abuse that
occurs when an abuser-most often a parent, guardian, or caregiverforcefully shakes an infant or small child, creating a whiplash motion that
causes acceleration-deceleration injuries.6 The shaking motion can cause
brain damage or death, often without external evidence of trauma.'
When first identified, the syndrome was believed to be pathognomonic
of SBS, or so characteristic of the syndrome as to lead beyond any doubt
4. See generally, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing expert
testimony and scientific evidence as well as the use of courts and judges as gatekeepers); Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Specifically applicable to this Note is the Daubert
standard, which is the result of three cases decided in the 1990s: Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)The Daubert standard requires an expert's testimony and opinions to be based on scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. To determine if the expert is qualified to
testify, the judge must determine whether the testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). In addition, scientific
testimony must be grounded "in the methods and procedures of science." Id. at 590. More specifically,
the Daubertstandard requires that testimony be "derived by the scientific method" and "supported by
appropriate validation." Id. The Court lists several pertinent (although not determinative) factors for
consideration, including whether the theories and techniques have been tested; whether they were
subjected to peer review and publication; whether they enjoy widespread acceptance in the applicable
community; and whether the techniques employed by the expert have a known error rate. Id. at 59398.
5. Recently, there has been some debate regarding use of the name "shaken baby syndrome" to
describe these head injuries in infants. For example, in 2009 the American Association of Pediatrics
urged that the name SBS be changed to "abusive head trauma." They explained that "[a]lthough the
term [SBS] is well known and has been used for a number of decades, advances in the understanding
of the mechanisms and clinical spectrum of injury associated with abusive head trauma compel us to
modify our terminology to keep pace with our understanding of pathologic mechanisms." Abusive
Head Trauma: A New Name for Shaken Baby Syndrome, AM. Ass'N PEDIATRIcs (Apr. 27, 2009, 12:0
AM), http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/mayo9headtrauma.htm; see also Shaken Baby Syndrome
Given New Name: Pediatrics Group Urges Use of Diagnostic Term "Abusive Head Trauma," MSNBC,
Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30425052/ ("The American Academy of
Pediatrics wants doctors to stop using the term 'shaken baby syndrome' in favor of something more
scientific. The nation's largest pediatricians' group recommends 'abusive head trauma,' calling it a
more comprehensive diagnosis for brain, skull and spinal injuries associated with shaking and other
head injuries inflicted on infants. The Academy says the new diagnostic term should be used in
medical records and that it may provide more clarity in the courtroom."). Others have suggested the
name "non-accidental head injury" in place of SBS. Robert Minns & Anthony Busuttil, Patterns of
Presentation of the Shaken Baby Syndrome: Four Types of Inflicted Brain Injury Predominate, 328
Birr. MED. J. 766,766 (2004). This Note uses the term SBS for the sake of clarity and familiarity.
6. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (And
Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 Caim. L. BULL., Jan.-Feb. 205o, at 156, 159.
7. Id. at 161.
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to an SBS diagnosis.' SBS prosecutions were historically "open and shut"
cases in which the adult last in contact with the injured or deceased child
was charged.' Current medical research and legal scholarship, however,
cast doubt on longstanding assumptions about nonaccidental infant
death."o Recent publications have sparked a heated debate regarding the
scientific status of SBS as well as when and how medical experts should
be utilized in the courtroom." A growing minority of medical experts
now challenge the belief that specific physical symptoms can ever
conclusively prove child abuse and argue that a legal analysis of SBS
should "start with the premise that there are no pathognomonic markers
that specifically define [the syndrome].""
Despite the claim that SBS is a "prosecution paradigm without
precedent," this Note argues that courts have experienced and still
confront phenomena similar to abusive head trauma. 3 To identify SBS as
wholly unique precludes a comparative analysis that may illuminate
courts' past successes and mistakes when utilizing scientific evidence and
expert testimony at trial. 4 At present, publications addressing SBS often
fail to place legal questions within this broader evidentiary context.
Questioning or criticizing the accuracy of current science can only get us
so far. Legal scholars should formulate specific evidentiary rules and
techniques limiting expert testimony to that of general causation unless
the expert can demonstrate specific causation with a high degree of

8. Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project:Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal
Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. I, II (2009) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer 2009].
9. Id. at I8.
to. See, e.g., id. at 11-12 ("[Tlhe scientific underpinnings of SBS have crumbled over the past
decade as the medical establishment has deliberately discarded a diagnosis defined by shaking.").
I1. For example, the New York Times dedicated much of its February 6, 2011 Sunday magazine
to SBS and its current controversies. See Emily Bazelon, Shaken, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2011, at 30
(Magazine) (discussing several individual cases of SBS and the emerging trend of doctors questioning
the orthodoxy of shaken baby syndrome, raising the possibility that innocent people have been sent to
jail).
12. See, e.g., Richard M. Hirshberg, Reflections on the Syndrome ofthe "Shaken Baby," 29 MED. &
L. 103, 118 (2010) ("[A] definitive understanding of the presumptive biomechanical, neurochemical
and pathological mechanisms explaining the findings in the 'shaken baby' remain in the realm of
'unsettled science."'); see also Bazelon, supra note ii, at 34 ("We should not be prosecuting and
convicting people in shaken-baby cases ... based on the triad of symptoms, without other evidence of
abuse. If the medical community can't agree about all the conflicting data and research, how is a jury
supposed to reach a conclusion that's beyond a reasonable doubt?" (quoting Keith Findley, a lawyer
for the Wisconsin Innocence project)).
13. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at I.
14. Indeed, in her 2ol article, Deborah Tuerkheimer acknowledges the potential usefulness of a
broader comparative analysis. She states, for example, that "[b]y using SBS as a vehicle for exploring
surfacing tensions between science and criminal law, I mean to suggest that seemingly unique features
of these cases may, in fact, be shared by other crime prosecution models that we see today, and more
importantly, that we will confront in the future." Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent
Prosecutionand the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L.
REV. 513,550 (201)

[hereinafter Tuerkheimer 201].
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accuracy. A careful application of social frameworks evidence, which
uses social science to construct a background context for the facts at issue
in a specific case, can help bridge the gap between prosecutors' current
ability to demonstrate general causation and their desire to make
individualized causal deductions.'5
This Note is organized in two parts. Part I explores SBS and the
debate regarding use of expert medical testimony at trial to prove child
abuse and nonaccidental death. We are presently confronted with the
problem of how best to prosecute and defend alleged SBS given its
current status as an "unsettled science."" In an SBS trial, if expert
testimony is excluded based on lack of scientific methodology, lack of
scientific consensus, or otherwise, there may be insufficient evidence for
the prosecution to satisfy its burden of proof. Yet the admission of
specific causation testimony may mislead the court as to current scientific
understanding or prejudice the jury's interpretation of the facts."
Part II argues that a careful application of John Monahan and
Laurens Walker's social frameworks theory can lay the groundwork for
new evidentiary techniques in the defense and prosecution of SBS. By
limiting expert testimony to that of social frameworks, courts can
encourage a thorough exploration of pertinent scientific and corroborating
evidence, while at the same time preventing inappropriate specific
15. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987) ("[A] new generic use of social science in law ... is emerging from
recent cases.... [E]mpirical information is being offered that incorporates aspects of both of the
traditional uses: general research results are used to construct a frame of reference or background
context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case. We call this new use of
social science in law the creation of social frameworks.").
16. See Hirshberg, supra note 12, at 117-18 ("The main thrust of this paper is to emphasize the
obligation of the treating physicians and nurses to exercise extreme caution in designating a child's
injuries as 'intentional' when, in fact, a thorough examination of all of the findings might lead to
another conclusion and avoid the deeply tragic results of a misdiagnosis. It should also be recognized
that a definitive understanding of the presumptive biomechanical, neurochemical and pathological
mechanisms explaining the findings in the 'shaken baby' remain in the realm of 'unsettled science."').
17. See, e.g., id. at I16-17 (discussing additional problems with expert testimony in SBS cases); see
also id. at 1o4 ("[J]uries are understandably horrified and inflamed by post-mortem and operative
photos of infants and children and 'talking points' that exaggerate the forces required to produce a
subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhage. Correlation has been made with some in these cases, to
the forces that result from a child being 'thrown 50 feet in an auto accident, falling from a five story
window, or being thrown against a wall by an angry adult."'). It is important to state that this Note
does not question the existence of SBS as a serious and tragic medical condition. See Dr. John M.
Leventhal, Letter to the Editor, A Spotlight on Shaken Baby Syndrome, NEW YORK TIMEs, Sept. 21,
201o, at A2o ("As pediatricians who evaluate and care for abused children at Yale-New Haven
Children's Hospital, we do not believe there has been a 'shift in scientific consensus' about the
syndrome. There is, however, growing scientific evidence that what is now called abusive head trauma
is real; that it can be caused by shaking an infant or by shaking and striking the head on a surface; and
that it can result in serious brain injury and death."). Science conclusively demonstrates that specific
physiological indications are clearly associated with the violent shaking of infants. In other words,
causation has been demonstrated at a general level. This Note concentrates on the problems courts
face when determining whether violent shaking caused the injuries or death of a particular infant.
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causation testimony. This model is particularly applicable in two areas:
when a specific scientific methodology has survived Daubertanalysis, but
new scientific findings begin to undermine longstanding conclusions; and
when defense and prosecution experts wish to present contradictory
evidence that is independently admissible under Daubert.5
Part II then compares SBS to other areas of the law, including rape
and arson prosecution. Although these areas are not intuitively similar to
SBS, they possess a range of characteristics rendering them worthy of
comparison." What makes these phenomena comparable to SBS is that
presentation of scientific evidence is essential in determining whether a
crime ever took place. Just as infants can be the unfortunate victims of
falls or other accidents, sex can be consensual and fires can have
unintentional causes. Further, as in SBS cases, expert testimony in rape
and arson trials is often used to formulate both factual and legal
conclusions.
Finally, this Note explores the paradigmatic models of eyewitness
testimony and gender stereotyping, highlighting the use of social
frameworks evidence not as a mechanism to prove specific causation, but

18. For example, at an SBS trial there may be situations where experts for both the prosecution
and the defense put on evidence that, despite sound scientific basis, is contradictory in very significant
ways. For example, a longstanding debate regarding SBS is whether shaking alone can cause an
infant's death or whether shaking will cause death only in conjunction with impact. See Tuerkheimer
2009, supra note 8, at 17. At trial, experts for both the prosecution and the defense may testify that
their view can be supported by scientific data. Unlike other scenarios in which the record is so lopsided
that the judge would be justified in excluding one side's testimony, "both sides seem to have enough
data to qualify their opinions as admissible conclusions under Daubert... [and] both sides can attack
the other's conclusion by pointing to numerous experts who have reached a diametrically opposed
conclusion." Edward Imwinkelried, Methodology vs. Conclusion in Rebuttal Testimony: The Debate
over Shaken-Baby Syndrome Exemplifies a Genuine Battle of the Experts Under Daubert, 32 NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 2, 20o, at 9.
19. A range of phenomena including child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome ("CSAAS")
and parental alienation syndrome ("PAS") can also illustrate similar logic. This Note highlights SBS,
rape trauma syndrome ("RTS"), and arson to illustrate a range of phenomena that, at first glance, do
not appear to share categorical similarities. CSAAS, first identified by Roland Summit in 1983, is
"used to explain the child's position in the dynamics of sexual victimization." Donna A. Gaffney,
PTSD, RTS, and Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-Finding Aids
24 PACE L. REV. 271, 283 (2003). There are no specific behavioral symptoms that can characterize
sexual abuse victims. For example, the absence of sexualized behavior does not confirm sexual abuse
nor does the existence of sexualized behavior confirm its existence. See Michael E. Lamb, The
Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse: An International,Interdisciplinary Consensus Statement, 28 FAM.
L.O. 151, 154 (1994)The term "PAS" was introduced in 1985 by psychiatrist Richard Gardner. See Barbara Jo Fidler
& Nicholas Bala, Children Resisting PostseparationContact with a Parent:Concepts, Controversies,and
Conundrums 48 FAM. Cr. REV. IO, 12 (20Io). The syndrome arises primarily in the context of child
custody disputes. Similar to CSAAS, there is some debate as to PAS's diagnostic capacity and many
writers have abandoned the term "syndrome" when writing about PAS. Id. at 13. While some mental
health professionals support the validity of PAS as a diagnosis, others argue that this is not clinically
valid and argue further that the classification "does not meet the criteria for a syndrome from an
evidentiary perspective." Id.
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as a device used to educate and orient the fact finder.o The proper use of
evidence to familiarize a judge or jury with current social and scientific
trends is invaluable. Rejecting use of expert testimony in an SBS trial
altogether may be as adverse to judicial integrity as allowing expert
testimony without proper limitations.
I. SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A DIAGNOSIS IN TRANSITION
Since it was first diagnosed in the 196os, SBS was believed to be
pathognomonic of abuse. However, new data calls into question the
accuracy of the SBS diagnosis and its association with nonaccidental
death.
A.

HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING AND CURRENT DEBATE

When prosecuting SBS, presentation of scientific evidence is
imperative not only to prove whether a given individual did or did not
commit a particular crime, but also to demonstrate whether a crime ever
took place." All elements of the crime, including mens rea and actus
reus, are proven by scientific testimony." Specifically, "[diegree of force
testimony not only establishes causation, but also the requisite state of
mind."" Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer argues that "[i]n its classic
formulation, SBS comes as close as one could imagine to a medical
diagnosis of murder," given that prosecutors use scientific evidence to
prove not only the mechanism of the injury or death, but the intent to
harm as well as the identity of the killer.24
When prosecuting child abuse, there are often no witnesses, other
than the defendant, available to testify about the events that transpired,
and frequently there is little-to-no physical evidence remaining. When
physical evidence does remain, it may become so central to an
investigation that its importance can become overstated."
20. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 559. Instead of simply recognizing the existence and
legitimacy of social frameworks as a model, this Note emphasizes situations in which expert testimony
should be strictly limited to general causation until the science underlying the relevant phenomenon
has improved to a threshold degree.
21. This is true in at least two other areas of the law: arson and rape. See infra Part II.B.
22. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 5.

23. Id.
24. Id.

25. See, e.g., Tania Simoncelli, HR 3214 (The "Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act
of 2003") and the Tolling of Statutes of Limitations, ACLU (Nov. 6, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/
technology-and-liberty/hr-3214-advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-act-2oo3-and-toing-statute.
Simoncelli discusses the trial and exoneration of Josiah Sutton, who spent nearly five years in jail for a
rape he could not have committed. Id. Sutton's conviction rested almost entirely DNA tests that a lab
technician mistakenly reported, and testimony at trial by a lab technician who "presented the DNA
data to the jury in a misleading way that overstated its value." Id.; see also FBI: Chemist May Have
Botched Evidence, ABC NEWS, Apr. 28, 20io, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=13bo76&page=i
("An investigation says one Oklahoma City Police chemist may have sent several people to prison and
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Diagnosis of SBS is based upon the now widely accepted hypothesis
that if an adult shakes an infant violently for approximately four or five
oscillations during a period of three to ten seconds, the acceleration and
deceleration of the brain within the skull can cause severe injury and
often death. The infant's heavy head and weak neck muscles permit
"the shaking to produce tremendous acceleration and deceleration forces
[and the] alternating to-and-fro shaking causes [the back of the skull] to
hit the backbone."" The rotational movement of the brain in the cranial
cavity generates forces strong enough to tear veins in the brain.28 Victims
of SBS are frequently less than one year old and most are less than six
months old."
Medical professionals historically identified SBS based on three
brain injuries in infants: retinal hemorrhages, subdural hemorrhages, and
cerebral edema.3 0 Doctors began diagnosing SBS beginning in the early
1970s after medical practitioners identified a pattern among infants
admitted to hospitals exhibiting internal injuries."' The first was German
pediatrician Henry Kempe, who identified co-occurring symptoms in
children in the 196os and concluded that the injuries were likely caused
by abuse rather than accidents." A decade later, John Caffey expanded
on Kempe's findings and suggested that babies could be seriously injured
without external signs of trauma to the body.33 He took Kempe's research
a step further by arguing that the discovery of subdural hematoma and
intraocular hemorrhages in an infant was sufficient to determine abuse.34
Although Caffey outlined a biomechanical understanding of the
diagnosis, he also warned that "[c]urrent evidence [was] manifestly
incomplete and largely circumstantial."" Over time, however, the triad
markers came to be understood universally as proof of abuse.36 Not only
did courts repeatedly admit SBS triad markers into evidence, but both
to executions with evidence that was inconclusive and 'overstated"').
26. Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 159.
27. Id. at 159-60.

28. Id. at 16o.
29. Stephen C. Boos, Abusive Head Trauma as a Medical Diagnosis,in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN
INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 49, 50 (Lori Frasier et al. eds.,

2oo6) (explaining that the average age of infants diagnosed with SBS is between three months and ten
months, though children up to three years old have been diagnosed).
30. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 5. These three injuries are referred to as the "triad" of
symptoms of SBS. See Tuerkheimer 2oll, supra note 14, at 514.

31. Genie Lyons, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Questionable Scientific Syndrome and a Dangerous
Legal Concept, 2003 UTAH L. REV. I109, 1119.
32. Id.

33. John Caffey, The Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome: Manual Shaking by the Extremities with
Whiplash-Induced Intracranial and Intraocular Bleedings, Linked with Residual Permanent Brain
Damage and Mental Retardation,54 PEDIATRICS 396, 402 (1974).

34. Id.
35. Id. at 403.
36. Tuerkheimer 2oo9, supra note 8, at ii.

July 2ol1]

BRIDGING THE GAP

1847

the legal and scientific communities came to ascribe a "great significance"
to such testimony."
When an infant presented with retinal hemorrhages, subdural
hemorrhages, and cerebral edema, doctors and other experts concluded
that nonaccidental shaking could be the only cause of the injuries.38
Between 1200 and 1400 children in the United States alone sustain head

injuries attributed to abuse each year and about 200 cases of SBS are
prosecuted annually.39 There is usually not much dispute that the children
were abused in some way, because doctors discover other signs of abuse
such as cuts, bruises, burns, fractures, or a history or pattern of these
types of injuries.4 o However, in about fifty to seventy-five percent of SBS
cases, the only medical evidence presented by the prosecution is the
"triad" of internal symptoms. 41
Recently, doubts have arisen as to the accuracy and scientific
validity of evidence used in SBS trials. Most notably, Tuerkheimer has
criticized U.S. courts' current treatment of SBS, stating that the potential
risk of wrongful conviction will result in our legal system's "next
innocence project."' Citing a range of medical and legal publications,
Tuerkheimer argued that SBS "has been reincarnated to reflect a shifted
consensus" and that "until scientific consensus has been achieved, the
criminal justice system must find its own solutions to the problem of a
diagnosis already morphed and still in transition." 43
Studies suggesting that brain bleeding and swelling in infants can be
caused by something other than nonaccidental shaking cast doubt on
SBS as a pathognomonic condition. For example, short-distance falls
may cause fatal head injuries." In addition, a child suffering from a fatal

37. Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 167.
38. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 3-4.
39. Bazelon, supra note II, at 32.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Tuerkheimer 2oo9, supra note 8, at 23. ("In SBS cases, identifying the factually innocent is
complicated by two related propositions. First, no crime whatsoever may have occurred, thus
eliminating the opportunity to establish someone else's culpability. Second, at least to date, science has
not definitively established an alternative explanation for the injuries associated with SBS. What this
means is that a significant number of people convicted in triad-only prosecutions are likely innocent of
wrongdoing, but others are not, and we have no way of differentiating between these groups.
Accordingly, we may rightly be troubled by the convictions of those whose factual innocence is
unproven.").
43. Id. at 16, 58.
44. See John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls, 22 AM. J.
FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY I, IO (2005) (reviewing Consumer Product Safety Commission data on
playground equipment injuries, and concluding that even short falls by infants can produce hematoma
if the fall generates sufficient rotational force). Among other conclusions, Plunkett suggests that "[a]
fall from less than 3 meters (Io feet) in an infant or child may cause fatal head injury and may not cause
immediate symptoms.... A history by the caretaker that the child may have fallen cannot be
dismissed." Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1848

[Vol. 62:I839

head injury may experience a lucid interval for more than seventy-two
hours before death, challenging the longtime presumption that the
perpetrator must be the adult or caretaker who was with the infant
immediately before hospitalization or death.45
The topic of lucid intervals is one of heated debate. The executive
director of the National District Attorneys Association, Scott Burns,
responded to Tuerkheimer'S 2009 publication by stating that "[s]cientific
reality shows that lucid intervals do not occur in children who suffer
[these] types of devastating injuries."46 Burns attacked Tuerkheimer's
reliance on a study by Dr. M.G.F. Gilliland, arguing that it "did not
document a single reliable case in which a child sustained a fatal head
injury and did not immediately become symptomatic."4 Undeterred,
Tuerkheimer reiterates what she views as a real and current controversy
surrounding lucid intervals, arguing that "[d]octors now concede the
possibility of a lag between injury and neurological manifestation.",4
Scientists point to other problems with the pathognomonic view of
SBS. For example, scientists argue that shaking an infant with an
"acceleration-deceleration force ... [strong enough] to cause retinal
hemorrhage and subdural hematoma ... would necessarily damage the
neck and cervical spinal cord or column."49 Most infants diagnosed with
SBS, however, do not present this type of neck or back injury.o In
addition, Canadian forensic pathologist Evan Matshes recently conducted

45. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at i8; see also Jan E. Leestma, Case Analysis of BrainInjured Admittedly Shaken Infants: 54 Cases, 26 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 199, 211 (2005)
(finding immediate onset of symptoms to be infrequent in "confessed shaking" cases). In emergency
medicine, a lucid interval is a temporary improvement in a patient's condition after a traumatic brain
injury, after which the condition deteriorates. See David Kushner, Mild Traumatic Brain Injury:
Toward Understanding Manifestations and Treatment. 15 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 158, 1617-24
(1998).
46. Scott Bums, NDAA Responds to New York Times Shaken Baby Syndrome Editorial,
PROSECUTOR: J. NAT'L DIsTRIcT Arr'ys Ass'N, July/Aug./Sept. 20o, at 30, 31. Scott Burns's response
was submitted to the New York Times, but it was not published.
47. Burns, supra note 46, at 31 (citing M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval Duration Between Injury and
Severe Symptoms in Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC ScI.
723 (1998)).

48. Tuerkheimer

2011,

supra note 14, at 517 (citing Robert Huntington, Letter, Symptoms

Following Head Injury, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 105 (2002) (describing a case study in

which an infant manifesting symptoms associated with SBS was observed by hospital personnel in a
prolonged lucid state-sixteen hours-before dying).
49. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 1S-20; see also Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome:
A Biomechanics Analysis of Injury Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC ScI. INT'L 71 (2005). Bandak engaged in
a "biomechanics analysis of the reported SBS levels of rotational velocity and acceleration of the head
for their injury effects on the infant head-neck." Id. at 71. He compared SBS data with experimental
data on the "structural failure limits of the cervical spine" in animal models and human neonate
cadaver models. Id. He concluded that an infant head "subjected to the levels of rotational velocity
and acceleration called for in the SBS literature" would experience forces exceeding the limits of
structural failure of the cervical spine. Id.
50. Id. at 78.
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a peer-reviewed study of 123 autopsies performed on infants in Florida
who died from natural or accidental circumstances, or were the victims of
homicide, to investigate the likelihood of retinal hemorrhages."
Although the children who died as a result of homicide were more likely
to have severe retinal hemorrhages than those in the natural or
accidental categories, Matshes emphasized that his findings could be
explained by factors other than abuse. 2 He stated that "[i]t is simply
incorrect to state that severe retinal hemorrhaging is diagnostic of abuse
or shaking""
In addition, the inability to create scientifically reliable tests to
duplicate SBS is problematic. When studying SBS, researchers are
obviously unable to experiment on human subjects, and ethical
considerations often prevent experimentation on animals.54 As a result,
experts are unable to present data in court representing precisely how
often a particular phenomenon occurs or under what circumstances it
will or will not occur in the future. Some scholars therefore argue that
individuals cannot or should not be found guilty of child abuse on the
basis of subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhaging alone." Today, the
admissibility of expert testimony on SBS varies from one jurisdiction to
another."

51. Bazelon, supra note ii, at 36.
52. Id. For example, Matshes explained that "the children in the homicide group had isolated
head injuries and were more likely to be resuscitated for a period of time" and that therefore, "[iln the
aftermath, they were more likely to develop brain swelling and bleeding disorders that may explain the
severe retinal hemorrhaging." Id.
53. Id.
54. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 20 n.123. But see Ayub Ommaya, Whiplash Injury and
Brain Damage: An Experimental Study, 204 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 285 (1968). Ommaya's study is often
cited by those defending the SBS diagnosis, although the experiment itself did not specifically test
brain injury in human infants, nor did it test the act of shaking. In the experiment, researchers gave
anesthesia to rhesus monkeys and placed them in an apparatus designed to mimic a rear end collision.
Id. at 285-86. After the tests, the researchers killed the monkeys and autopsied their bodies and
brains. Id. The researchers identified the monkeys who had suffered subdural hematomas to
determine the force level at which that type of brain damage would result, and speculated about the
extrapolation from the results in monkeys to humans. Id. at 287-88.
55. Hirshberg, supra note 12, at 116; see also Lyons, supra note 31, at 114 ("SBS in its current
form should not be accepted by courts as good science. Rather, SBS should be seen as scientifically
unproven and insufficient, standing alone, to be the legal basis for proving that a crime has been
committed."); Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 16 ("With little attention outside of the medical
community, universally held tenets have been undermined, leading a segment of the scientific
establishment -including some formerly prominent supporters of its validity-to perceive the
diagnosis as illegitimate.").
56. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 293 S.W-3d 413, 420 (Ky. 2009) ("We are mindful that
testimony regarding SBS is accepted in other jurisdictions; however, in Kentucky, such testimony has
not been recognized as reliable for purposes of judicial notice. As such, it was incumbent upon the
Commonwealth to demonstrate the reliability of the scientific methodology underpinning SBS, and it
was error for the trial court to judicially notice SBS and shift the burden to prove its unreliability onto
Hamilton.").
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In her 2011 publication, Tuerkheimer discusses various trials that
were reopened to hear additional evidence regarding SBS as well as
situations in which SBS defendants were eventually exonerated of their
crimes." In Michigan, for example, a judge sentenced defendant Julie
Baumer to ten to fifteen years in prison for violently shaking her nephew
and leaving him permanently blind.'5 The same judge then ordered a new
trial after hearing postconviction testimony that the infant's injuries were
caused by venous sinus thrombosis, a rare form of a stroke caused by a
blood clot." The judge ruled that Baumer received ineffective legal
representation because her lawyer did not retain an expert to investigate
alternative causes of the infant's injury." After Baumer had served four
years of her prison sentence, a new jury returned a verdict of not guilty. 6i
At trial, expert testimony included six doctors for the defense and three
doctors for the prosecution, all of whom testified regarding images of the
infant's brain.62 Jurors explained the jury's decision by citing a lack
evidence of wrongdoing, stating: "We could not tie Julie Baumer to
being responsible for those injuries to that child.

. .

. There was absolute

reasonable doubt. [The injury] could have been caused by abuse or it
could have been caused by a natural disease process.... We concluded
we didn't know." ' Defense counsel stated that the case's outcome might
have national ramifications given that it is the first case in which venous
sinus thrombosis was shown to mimic SBS.6 4
Similarly, Tuerkheimer points to State v. Edmunds as evidence that
there has been a significant shift in scientific consensus regarding SBS in
recent years.6 5 In early 2007, the same judge who had presided over
Audrey Edmunds's trial over a decade earlier conducted a five-day
evidentiary hearing in support of her motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.6 The defense experts testified that since the
mid-L99os "significant research has undermined the scientific foundations
57. Tuerkheimer 2011, supra note 14, at 530-31.
58. Id. at 528 n.I24 (citing Christine Ferretti, Baby Abuse Case Reopens, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 9,
2oo9, at A3.

59. Id. (citing Ferretti, supra note 58); see also, Jan Stam, Thrombosis of the Cerebral Veins and
Sinuses, 352 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1791-98 (2oo5). Thrombosis of the cerebral veins and sinuses is a
cerebrovascular disorder that most often affects young adults and children, involving blood clots in the
brain or in venous sinuses. Id. The disorder can be caused by a head injury, obstetrical delivery, or an
infection. Symptoms include severe headache, focal abnormalities, or stroke. Id.
6o. Tuerkheimer 201, supra note 14, at 528 n.124.
61. Jameson Cook, Aunt Found Not Guilty of First Degree Child Abuse After Spending Four
Years in Prison, MAYCOMB DAILY J., Oct. 15, 20Io, available at http://www.macombdaily.com/
articles/200/0/5/news/doc4cb86fc515b493653oo899.txt.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Tuerkheimer 2o l, supra note 14, at 527 (citing State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2oo8)).

66. Tuerkheimer

2009,

supra note 8, at 48.
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for SBS, creating substantial challenges to matters that were nearly
universally accepted in the medical community at the time of Edmunds's
trial."6 The defense experts stated further that at the time of the original
trial they, too, would have testified that shaking was the cause of death,
yet an "evolution in science" changed their opinion about the likely
causes of the injuries.68 Although the trial court denied the motion, the
appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that there
was a reasonable likelihood that a different result would be reached at a
new trial based on new evidence.6 Edmunds was granted a new trial and
all charges against her were dismissed."o
Relying primarily on the Edmunds decision, recent defendants have
also made efforts to challenge SBS convictions. In Wisconsin, a trial
judge granted defendant Quentin J. Louis a new trial, stating:
[A]s to a new trial in the interest of justice, the principal issue was
whether any shaking done by Louis was the cause of [the baby's] death.

However, the jury did not hear that [SBS] is subject to debate in the

medical community, that [the baby] may have died of a chronic
subdural hematoma over a period of months and that for brain injuries
to occur, there must also be evidence of neck injuries. At trial, the

State assertively and repetitively relied upon the tenants [sic] of [SBS]
to prove its case. To uphold the integrity of our system of justice, a jury
should be afforded the opportunity to hear and evaluate this other
evidence.'

The court's synopsis of the trial evidence was indeed a "virtual primer in
the SBS prosecution paradigm,"' given that, in no uncertain terms, the
court stated that specific causation was demonstrated at trial:
What the jury heard at trial from the medical experts was that from
[the baby's] injuries alone, they could determine that (i) the only

explanation for [the baby's] injuries was that she was shaken, (2) since
SBS did not allow for a lucid interval and [the baby] was in Louis's care
at the time she went limp, he must have shaken her and, (3) that
Louis's shaking therefore was the cause [of the baby's] death.73

67. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 4-5, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)
(No. 2oo7AP000933).
68. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 48-49.
69. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 599 ("[A]t trial, the State was able to easily overcome Edmunds's
argument that she did not cause [the baby's] injuries by pointing out that the jury would have to
disbelieve the medical experts in order to have a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds's guilt. Now, a jury
would be faced with competing credible medical opinions in determining whether there is a reasonable
doubt as to Edmunds's guilt. Thus, we conclude that the record establishes that there is reasonable
probability that a jury, looking at both the new medical testimony and the old medical testimony,
would have a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds's guilt.").
70. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at 51.
71. State v. Louis, No. o5-CF-193, slip op. at 12 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2009), available at

http://scribd.com/doc122325225/State-of-Wisconsin-v-Quentin-J-Louis.
72. Tuerkheimer 2011, supra note 14, at 530.

73. Id. at 531 (citing Louis, No. 05-CF-193, slip op. at ii).
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In his brief, Louis quoted a range of medical evidence to demonstrate
that the "medical/legal debate over Shaken Baby Syndrome rages on."74
B.

SBS GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY
SBS, like virtually all scientific evidence, has two components, which
the courts typically refer to as "general causation" and "specific
causation."" In a prosecution for SBS, the research indicating that
intentional shaking of an infant will lead to certain physical effects is
general, speaking to the scientific knowledge of the phenomenon in
question, and largely independent of the case at hand. If general
causation has been adequately demonstrated, there remains the question
of whether a particular case is an instance of that general phenomenon.
This is specific causation." Whereas general causation asks whether the
cause-and-effect relationship of interest (for example, does shaking an
infant lead to certain physical effects) is adequately demonstrated by the
research, specific causation asks whether the effects observed in this case
are attributable to the cause that is the focus of the prosecution."
SBS, as a subject of scientific research, presents the issues of general
and specific causation in the same way they arise in virtually all medical
causation cases. For example, if the question in a civil case was whether
the plaintiff developed lung cancer as a result of being exposed to
asbestos while working for the defendant, proof would be needed to
demonstrate both that asbestos is a likely cause of lung cancer and that
the plaintiff's lung cancer was probably caused by asbestos exposure.
The research studies on asbestos and lung cancer would be introduced to
demonstrate the general causation claim. Proving the specific causation
claim is much less straightforward and involves demonstrating first that
asbestos could have caused the lung cancer, and second that something
other than asbestos probably did not cause it. 79 Determining specific
causation requires many complex steps, including an exposure and health
PROVING

74. Brief of Defendant-Respondent, State v. Louis (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3,
CR), 2010 WL 3267969, at *8.

2010)

(No.

2009AP2502-

75. David Faigman, Judges as "Amateur Scientists," 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1220 (2oo6).

76. Id. ("Courts have recognized some of the difficulties inherent in employing general scientific
data to reach conclusions about specific cases. ... Not all science is engaged in describing cause and
effect relationships, however, so 'general causation' and 'specific causation' are subcategories of what
might be better termed 'general propositions' and 'specific applications.' Sometimes general scientific
propositions will be stated in terms of causation, but very often they will be associational, technical, or
descriptive. Specific application refers to the determination of whether a particular case is an instance,
use, or example of general propositions that are supported by adequate research.")
77. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 381-82 (2d ed. 2000).
78. David L. Faigman, Evidentiary Incommensurability: A Preliminary Exploration of the
Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to Individualized Legal Decision-Making,
75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2010).
79. Green et al., supra note 77, at 384-86.
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assessment, consideration of alternative causes, and finally the simple
question of "whether all the pieces of the puzzle fit together or not."8 To
some extent, the last step is a judgment call.8 '
There is little question that existing research supports the general
causation element of SBS, in that certain physical effects occur as a
consequence of violent shaking. The important and largely unexplored
issue in these cases is whether there is a sufficient scientific basis to allow
an expert to go further and testify regarding specific causation. The
ordinary methodology used in medical causation cases to determine
whether a particular case is an instance of a general phenomenon is
"differential etiology." 2
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the task concerns
identifying the underlying cause of the effect in question, and thus courts'
use of the term "differential diagnosis" is sometimes misleading and
incorrect.83 Differential diagnosis involves the identification of an illness
or behavioral condition experienced by an individual.84 For example, if a
patient presents herself to the doctor with symptoms of coughing, the
treating physician will attempt to "rule out" certain diagnoses, such as
lung cancer or asthma, based on medical history, environment, and so
forth, in order to eventually arrive at the correct diagnosis." Unlike
differential diagnosis, differential etiology involves the identification of
the cause or causes of the illness or behavioral condition.8
In practice, the techniques are often confused and have been
applied erroneously. Courts have a tendency to equate a doctor's
training and experience in differential diagnosis with the ability to make
conclusions based on differential etiology:
Although courts often say that physicians are well-trained in the
process of differential diagnosis and that they devote considerable
attention in medical school to learning clinical reasoning, in point of
fact the training is in the process of deducing disease based on a set of
symptoms and laboratory tests. This is a very different task than
deducing the cause of a disease.
80. Thomas S. Schrager, Science of Toxicology, General and Specific Causation, CAMBRIDGE
ToXICOLOGY GROUP, http://www.toxicologysource.com/scitox/generalandspecif.html (last visited July 4,
2o I); see also Joseph Sanders, Science Law and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 63, 85

(2009) ("Limits there may be, but undoubtedly the need for closure produces some shrinkage of the
'don't know' domain in the courtroom. Nowhere is this more evident than with respect to questions of
specific causation.... [L]arge parts of science focus on general principles, or at least on aggregate
findings, while courts are nearly always concerned, among other things, with facts about the individual
case.").
81. Schrager, supra note 80.
82. Faigman, supra note 78, at I131.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1130-31.
86. Id. at 1131.

87. Sanders, supra note 8o, at 85.
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For example, in Wynacht v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., a products
liability case arising from exposure to chemicals in wastewater released
from a lab, the judge held that the clinical treating physician was not
qualified to testify about medical causation.8 The court stated:
[T]here is a fundamental distinction between [the expert's] ability to
render a medical diagnosis based on clinical experience and her ability
to render an opinion on causation of [the plaintiff's] injuries.

. .

. [T]he

Court does not question, that [the expert] is an experienced physician,
qualified to diagnose medical conditions and treat patients. The ability
to diagnose medical conditions is not remotely the same, however, as
the ability to deduce, delineate, and describe, in a scientifically reliable
manner, the causes of these medical conditions.8
According to Joseph Hirshberg, the Emeritus Chairman of
Neurosurgery at St. Joseph Hospital in Houston, Texas, SBS is a
diagnosis of exclusion and should never be made casually.' Hirshberg
further argues that even when differential diagnosis techniques are
generally appropriate, "there may be a lack of knowledge of the
controversies and debates concerning the dynamic aspects of the
neuropathology and biomechanics" even among experienced specialists
in these fields.9' It follows that expert testimony by those who are
unqualified to deduce causation might result in the indictment or
conviction of innocent people.
Toxic tort cases provide good examples of situations in which
experts attempt to use general causation evidence to make deductions
related to specific causation. 2 Experts may claim that they have
undertaken a differential diagnosis when in actuality they have engaged
in a differential etiology, attempting to consider and eliminate plausible
causes of the disease.93 Professor David Bernstein argues that "the
substance of such testimony usually amounts to this: in the absence of
some other known causal mechanism, I speculate that the product or
substance at issue in this case caused the plaintiff's injury."' As

88. Wynacht v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 12o6 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).

89. Id. at 1209.
90. Hirshberg, supra note 12, at i i6.
91. Id. at 105.

92. See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial)Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 464 (2oo8) ("[P]laintiffs typically rely on evidence that is
directly suggestive (at most) only of general causation. For example, a plaintiff in a typical toxic tort
case may rely on any or all of the following types of evidence: animal studies usually involving much
higher relative exposure to the substance at issue; laboratory studies on cells; anecdotal case reports;
the temporal relationship between exposure and disease; regulatory actions by the government;
analogy to similar substances known to cause disease; studies on humans involving much higher
exposure levels; and epidemiological studies that are too preliminary to be of much value (if, for
example, their sample size is too small), or are suggestive but not statistically significant, or have a
relative risk well below two.").
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Bernstein's observation suggests, inferences about specific causation are
often little more than speculation or guesswork. At best, they are
judgments being made on the basis of the totality of the evidence.'
If judgment does indeed play a role, it raises the question: who, if
anyone, is qualified to offer an opinion whether an individual is legally
responsible for an infant's death? In the case of SBS, it should be the
task of the judge or jury, not the expert, to determine if the evidence
admitted at trial is sufficient to support a finding of specific causation.
Experts may be more qualified to testify regarding current scientific data,
medical examinations, or medical screenings, but, given current
controversies, it is not appropriate for experts to make "conclusions" as
to whether a given child was subject to shaking. "[S]ometimes even very
good science will not demonstrably improve the accuracy of individual
decision-making, though it might nonetheless be relevant and admissible
because it provides the triers of fact with contextual information that will
help them understand other evidence in the case."96
Professor David Faigman identifies the misuse of specific causation
in the courts and urges increased interest and investigation on the topic
by the legal community.' As Faigman states,
The primary area in which courts have considered this matter is in
medical causation cases where they distinguish routinely between
"general causation" and "specific causation." Courts and legal scholars
have not, however, engaged in a careful study of the details and
intricacies associated with this matter across the wide spectrum of cases
in which it presents itself. In addition, although the courts are passingly
familiar with the problem of evidentiary incommensurability, they
naturally approach the subject from their own need for information,
with little appreciation for how and whether scientists can produce this
information. Courts frequently demand empirical answers despite
scientists' inability to provide them."'
In general, "the law is interested not simply in whether a particular
variable causes a particular effect, but, ultimately, in whether a particular
variable did cause the effect."" Although science can sometimes prove
specific causation, in most circumstances scientific certainty can only

95. See id.
96. Faigman, supra note 78, at i i19.
97. Id. at I 17-18 ("My objective, however, is somewhat unusual. It is a call to arms. I do not aim
to resolve the incommensurability paradox, but rather to ring the fire-bell.").
98. Id. at I1'7 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at ii2o. Faigman argues:
A basic difference in perspective between science and the law is that science studies
individuals in order to make statements about populations, while the law studies
populations in order to make statements about individuals. It does not necessarily follow
that a scientist who can validly describe a general phenomenon also has the wherewithal to
say whether an individual case is an instance of that general phenomenon.
Id. at 1135-36.
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determine general causation."' This reality becomes important when the

verdict of a case rests on the prosecution's ability to prove both general
and specific causation.'o
Historically, some courts have allowed experts to testify as to
specific causation in SBS trials. In State v. Leibhart, for example, the
Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted expert testimony regarding SBS. 2 At trial,
an expert witness testified about features of SBS and explained the
syndrome in terms of general causation.'" The court overruled the
objection made by defense counsel, who argued that there was "not
sufficient foundation to give us an opinion."" The expert went on to
testify regarding specific causation, stating that
Emily's injury was consistent with shaken baby syndrome .. . that there
was no other explanation for her injury ... [and that] the injuries could
not have been caused by a bump on the head or a fall from a couch and
that the shaking that resulted in her injury could not have been done
by another child.'o
When questioned regarding the adequacy of scientific testing of
SBS, the trial judge responded by explaining that there are limits as to
realistic scientific understanding, and stated that SBS has "been clinically

oo. For example, Koplik's spots are pathognomonic of measles, and a diagnosis of asbestosis or
mesothelioma is thought to be pathognomonic of exposure to toxic chemicals. Id. at I12o. Faigman
states: "The strongest version of a path-specific relationship would be the unusual situation where a
cause and an effect are uniquely associated, such that the cause always produces the effect and the
effect is always attributable to the cause." Id.
io. See, e.g., Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 574 (citing State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227
(Minn. 1982)). In Saldana, the trial court incorrectly substituted a finding of general causation for the
necessary finding of specific causation. Here "the defendant was convicted of rape at a trial at which
an expert witness for the prosecution compared the complainant's reactions to the reactions of groups
of women who had been raped." Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in overturning the conviction,
stated that the jury "must not decide this case on the basis of how most people react to
rape.... Rather, the jury must decide what happened in this case." Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
102. State v. Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d 618, 628 (Neb. 2003).
103. Id. at 624.
104. Id.
105. Id. (footnote omitted). The court summarized the testimony of Dr. Shaffer, who treated the

child:
Emily had suffered shaken baby syndrome. Shaffer elaborated by testifying that the injury
indicated that Emily had been shaken in a manner such that the brain was shaken back and
forth and that small blood vessels and nerve cells in the brain were torn. He testified that
there was diffuse brain injury that was indicative of shaking, as opposed to trauma from
something such as a fall or a hit to the head which would result in a more localized injury.
Shaffer also testified that the shaking need not be forceful or for a long period of time for
the shaking to cause the injury from which Emily suffered. Shaffer testified that he saw no
signs of external injuries or bruising or evidence of blunt trauma on the outside of Emily's
head. Shaffer finally testified that symptoms of shaken baby syndrome would have
manifested themselves within minutes of the precipitating event.
Id. at 623-24 (footnotes omitted).
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tested as the best it can.""' The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that
"with respect to specific causation, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that such reasoning or methodology properly
could be applied to the facts in issue in this case.""
SBS presents the courts with a challenging situation, given that the
syndrome, by definition, presupposes a cause. A determination that an
infant suffered from SBS implies that the injury was caused by abuse,
even when the analysis appropriately utilizes differential diagnosis.
Indeed, the name "shaken baby syndrome" alone is indicative of crime
and suggests a finding of specific causation. Given that the underlying
definition of SBS is harm or death caused by nonaccidental shaking, an
expert testifying that SBS symtoms are present, for example, implies the
existence of physical abuse.' There has been a recent debate, in fact,
regarding the name given to SBS.'" The name describes the occurrence
of several of brain injuries occurring concurrently, yet by using the word
"syndrome" the name implies both a medical and legal conclusion.no
Although some medical practitioners have sought to change the name of
the diagnosis, many of the proposed alternatives are imperfect and still
presuppose abuse."'
II. SOCIAL FRAMEWORKS: LIMITING EXPERT TESTIMONY
Our legal system faces a challenge in responding to the current
controversy regarding SBS and other "science-dependent""' prosecutions.
Because science is an ever-evolving field, some argue that "[a]fter some
period of lagging behind, the law will eventually recalibrate itself in
response to the failed science movement and resolve the tension which
has propelled the system forward."" 3 This future-minded focus, however,
does not provide immediately applicable answers.

io6. Id. at 627.
107. Id. at 628.

io8. See, e.g., Molly Gena, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Medical Uncertainty Casts Doubt on
Convictions, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 70I, 726 ("[D]octors should not use the term 'shaken baby syndrome'
in courts at all, because it conjures up an image of abuse and violence and merely represents a legal
confusion that attempts to describe what happened to the baby.").
io9. See supra note 5.
io. See supra note 5.
iii. See supra note 5.
112. "Science-dependent prosecution" is a term adopted by Tuerkheimer "to convey the degree to
which any given prosecution relies on the claims of science for its success." See Tuerkheimer 2011,
supra note 14, at 551 n.305.
113. Id. at 550.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1858

A.

[Vol. 62:I1839

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW

Monahan and Walker's 1987 article, Social Frameworks, identified a
"new generic use of social science in law.""' Based on Kenneth Davis's
model, the article differentiated between legislative and adjudicative
facts."' According to Davis, facts concerning the immediate parties to a
lawsuit are adjudicative facts and facts relating to the determination of
law and policy are legislative facts." Monahan and Walker, however,
posited that there exists a range of situations where social science
evidence in the courtroom cannot be classified as either legislative or
adjudicative."' As an example, Monahan and Walker cite State v. Myers,
where the defendant was found guilty of criminal sexual conduct
involving a minor." The prosecution presented, over the objection of
defense counsel, a social science expert witness to testify to the
behavioral traits "typically observed" in abused children."' On appeal,
the defense claimed that this amounted to a reversible error, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "[b]ackground data
providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child's
conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its
evaluation of her credibility is helpful and appropriate." 2 0
In another article, Monahan and Walker highlight the applicability
of social frameworks evidence in cases involving eyewitness
identification, risk assessments of violence, Battered Woman Syndrome,
and Rape Trauma Syndrome ("RTS")."' Monahan and Walker's analysis
also reflects upon the question of when, if ever, an expert can testify by
way of "linking the general research to the specific facts of the case
before the jury.",' As discussed above, courts have taken different
approaches as to when "general" social science research should be linked
to a specific individual."' Today, social frameworks have become a
common and important part of trials, particularly employment

114. Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 559.

115' Id. at 563 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364,402-03 (1942)).
116. Davis, supra note 115, at 402-03.
117. Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 559.

118. Id. at 567 (citing State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984)).
119. Id.

State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 61o (Minn. 1984).
Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 563. RTS is a subset of post-traumatic stress disorder,
describing a cluster of psychological and physical signs, symptoms, and reactions that are common to
rape victims. The symptoms may occur during, immediately following, and for months or years after a
rape. See Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 981, 982 (1974) ("Rape trauma syndrome is the acute phase and long term reorganization
process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape.").
122. Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination:The Ascendance of "Social
120.
121.

Frameworks," 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1732-33 (2oo8).
123. See supra Part I.B.
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discrimination class actions where discrimination suits are often based
upon issues of stereotyping or prejudice."' In these trials, testimony
regarding general research provides context to the judge or jury so they
can better interpret case-specific data and make causal deductions when
appropriate.'
Monahan and Walker provide the example of International
Healthcare Exchange v. Global Healthcare Exchange, in which a trial
court allowed an expert to apply general principles from gender
stereotyping literature to the facts of a specific case.126 The expert
witness, after presenting a range of general social data regarding
stereotyping in the workplace, opined that the plaintiff's work
assignments and termination were the product of stereotyping.'" Yet
other courts have barred experts from presenting social frameworks and
then linking the research findings to issues in the specific case on trial."
For instance, in a 1991 opinion, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an epidemiologist's
general testimony on Hmong culture, but precluded the expert from
giving "his opinion regarding the specifics of [the] case, such as whether
there was a rape or why these particular plaintiffs did not report the
rape." 29
In applying social frameworks to the phenomenon of SBS,
''experts . . . should be prohibited from providing any linkage to the case
at hand" and instead leave the application of general research findings to
the factfinder. 3 o Until science reaches a higher degree of certainty, it
should be the judge or jury that is tasked with applying social
frameworks to the facts of each case. Of course, doctors should be able to
testify regarding test results or medical examinations of a victim. The
expert does have a superior degree of knowledge to explain existing
science and epidemiological studies and this kind of testimony can assist
the judge or jury. Educating and training trial counsel and expert

Monahan et al., supra note 122, at 1716.
125. See id. at 1716-17.
124.

126.

Id. at 1733 (citing Int'l Healthcare Exch., Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exch., L.L.C., 470 F. Supp.

2d 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
127.

Id. (quoting Int'l HealthcareExch., 47o F. Supp.

2d

at 355).

128. Id.
129. Monahan et al., supra note 122, at 1733 n.52 (quoting Dang Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 48182 (9 th Cir. 1991)).

130. Id. at 1734 ("The paradigmatic linkage question is presented when an expert testifies about
general research-that is, research that did not involve the parties in the case before the court and
then proposes to apply that research to the specific case at hand. Any such linkage offered by the
expert, however, would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires, as a threshold matter,
that testimony offered by an expert be based on 'sufficient facts or data.' No field of social science of
which we are aware permits its experts to speculate that a general finding, derived from group
averages or ecological correlations, applies to each member of the group or applies to one specific
group member but not to another." (footnotes omitted)).
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witnesses regarding the theory and application of social frameworks
evidence will result in more thorough investigations and unbiased
litigation. Expertise should be grounded in the ability to understand and
explain science, not in the ability to testify as to the guilt or innocence of
a particular party. Limiting testimony to social frameworks will move
factfinding away from the expert witness and back into the hands of the
judge or jury.

B.

PLACING SBS IN CONTEXT: RAPE AND ARSON PROSECUTION
Determining when and in what form SBS evidence should be
admitted at trial is a twofold issue. First, there must be a determination
that the evidence presented at trial fits into the pertinent legal
framework. To be introduced at trial at all, evidence must be legally
relevant. 3 ' Second, once relevance is established, the question becomes
how that evidence should be presented at trial and if its presentation
should be limited to social frameworks. Exploring similar paradigms
helps illustrate the usefulness of social frameworks at trial as well as the
challenges this technique inherently presents. In both rape and arson
trials, courts encounter a plethora of evidence that fits seamlessly into
the relevant legal framework, but must nonetheless be limited in its
introduction at trial.
Like SBS, rape and arson provide examples of offenses for which
science cannot always provide definitive mechanisms to prove specific
causation.' Again, it is worth comparing these phenomena with SBS
because in each, scientific evidence is essential in determining whether a
crime ever took place. In each of these contexts, evidence is utilized to
demonstrate a defendant's underlying intentions as well as to show that
the alleged actions were indeed criminal.
In rape prosecutions, because victims often wait to report the crime,
DNA evidence or physical injuries disappear before the initiation of a
criminal investigation and certainly before trial. 3 3 Other than statements
made by the alleged victim or perpetrator, the only available evidence
remaining may be a doctor's evaluation of a complainant's psychological
well-being, often including a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder
131. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
132. See Tuerkheimer 2011, supra note 14, at 553 ("[T]he crime of arson has striking parallels to

SBS. In fire investigations, as in forensic medicine, 'mistakes can lead to the belief that there is a crime
when none was committed.' Here, too, expert testimony establishes the actus reus (the damaging of
real property by means of fire or explosive). The requisite mens rea (typically knowledge) is proven by
the fire investigator's conclusion that the fire was purposely set." (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Maurice Possley, Arson Myths Fuel Errors,CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 18, 2004)); see also supra note 19.
133. See Laura M. Monroe et al., The Experience of Sexual Assault: Findings from a Statewide
Victim Needs Assessment, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 767, 770 (2005) (finding that more than half
of the victims at nineteen sexual assault centers in Maryland waited years before disclosing rape,
especially when a family member perpetrated the assault).
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or RTS." The medical diagnosis, it follows, often becomes a central
component of arguments made by both defense and prosecution counsel
at trial. In cases involving arson, evidence literally may be incinerated,
or, when evidence is available, fire investigators may rely heavily upon
bum patterns and other physical remnants despite their questionable
scientific validity.U5
Use of testimonial evidence in the courtroom to prove the
occurrence of SBS, rape, and arson has followed a similar trajectory. This
path can be understood in two stages. First, there was a historical period
in which evidence presented in court was believed sufficient to prove
both general and specific causation.136 Second, as scientific techniques
evolved, legal and scientific experts began to criticize and openly
challenge long-held assumptions about the strength of causal evidence as
well as the science that underlies each phenomenon. 137
Research into the effects of both SBS and rape is made difficult by a
shared inability to use human subjects in experimentation.13' Researchers
may recruit participants from rape crisis centers, yet those who seek help
are only a minority of sexual assault victims and therefore do not form a
representative sample.139 In addition, it is not easy to evaluate the
behavior of individuals prior to victimization, because it is impossible to
predict in advance who will later become the target of a violent crime. 40
Finally, other than through direct testimony by a victim, it is difficult to
ascertain whether post-rape symptoms were present before the
occurrence of the traumatic event in question. 4 '
Unlike SBS and rape, arson is an area in which investigators have
made a sizeable attempt to recreate fires for experimental and research
purposes." Indeed, during the 1970s and 198os, the Center for Fire
Research 43 conducted hundreds of test burns to characterize the
behavior of fire up to the point of "flashover."'" Yet of the hundreds of
fires conducted during this time period, none were examined after

134. Id.
135. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
136. Tuerkheimer 2009, supra note 8, at II.
137. Tuerkheimer 2oo9, supra note 8, at I1-12.
138. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY 446 (2009-20oo ed.).

139. Id.
140. Id. at 447.
141. Id.
142. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY 2o6 (2009-20o ed.).

143. The Center for Fire Research is now known as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
144. 5 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 2o6 ("Flashover is a transitional phase in a compartment
fire when the temperature rises to a level sufficient to cause ignition of all exposed combustible items
in the compartment.").
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flashover, so almost no evidence is available to demonstrate what types
of burn patterns are common after flashover is achieved.'45 Today, test
burns continue to take place on a regular basis in order to familiarize
investigators with the range and characteristics of burn patterns but the
"vast majority of burn exercises conducted over the years have been
performed with ... limited goals in mind ... [which] has resulted in many
trainees getting a one-sided view of fire investigation."4 6
Similar to the use of burn patterns to tell the story of a fire, the
behavior of an alleged victim can be relevant in a rape trial. A diagnosis
of RTS was historically introduced in court to prove the occurrence of a
sexual assault and continues to be admitted at trial today to explain a
victim's seemingly counterintuitive behavior or to demonstrate lack of
consent on the part of a complainant.'47 An expert, for example, might
testify that the delayed reporting of rape by an individual should not be
used to undermine the credibility of her testimony. Although RTS was
never understood to be pathognomonic of sexual assault, expert
testimony has been used for several purposes, including diagnosing an
alleged victim as having a psychological disorder; demonstrating or
undermining the credibility of the alleged victim; or, in limited
circumstances, directly demonstrating to the court that rape is the
underlying cause of psychological symptoms.4' In the case of RTS,
experts now understand "the syndrome [to be] so broad and
accommodate[] such a wide spectrum of behaviors that it 'would seem to
leave the only commonality among the victims their self-expressed report
of rape."' 49 In fact, critics argue that if the diagnosis of RTS were to be
subject to analysis under Daubert, it might be excluded for lack of

145. Id. at 212.
146. Id. Burn exercises are often conducted for the purpose of familiarizing investigators with what
an ignitable liquid burn pattern looks like or to provide extinguishment exercises for firefighters. Id. at
212-13. Two types of test bums are usually employed, the first attempting to test one or more basic
hypotheses about a fire, and the other attempting to reconstruct a particular fire. The second type,
however, requires enormous expenses often ranging from $io,ooo to $ioo,ooo and thus is only
conducted when a fire has caused multiple deaths or when the damages are in the millions of dollars.
Id. at 213.
147. Courts have at times attempted to draw a distinction between prohibiting testimony about
RTS to prove that a rape occurred, and allowing it for the limited purpose of proving that the alleged
victim did not consent. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. This distinction can be challenging,
however, given that lack of consent is a principal element of rape.
148. See, e.g., State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d 822, 829 (Kan. 1984) (allowing an expert to testify to the
victim's diagnosis but not allowing testimony that a victim was, in fact, raped); see also State v.
Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 751-52 (Md. 1986) (allowing testimony that rape was the underlying trauma of
the victim's post-traumatic stress disorder, on the theory that testimony about post-traumatic stress
disorder is medical testimony).
149. Keith Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for
Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 92o (2oo8) (quoting Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing
Inequities in Admission of Social Science Evidence in CriminalCases, 24 U. Ainc. LnLE ROCK L. REV.
41, 51 (2001)).
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scientific validity.' Indeed, most courts do not substantively analyze the
reliability or scientific basis of the syndrome, but instead rationalize
admission of evidence by relying on former court decisions that accept
the syndrome as scientifically valid."' Despite criticisms, almost all
jurisdictions admit expert testimony on RTS into evidence."'
Despite its relevance at trial, a victim's behavior or a doctor's
clinical diagnosis of that behavior is usually not enough to convict or
exonerate a defendant. To some extent, social frameworks' limitations
have been applied in cases of rape to limit an expert's ability to testify
regarding actual guilt or innocence. Although the courts do not always
refer to "social frameworks" explicitly, in practice the methods utilized
closely resemble the Monahan and Walker model. Specifically, it has
been suggested that expert testimony in rape cases falls into one of five
categories: (i) fact-based testimony about the general behavior of rape
victims, (2) fact-based testimony about the general diagnostic criteria of
RTS, (3) testimony about victim's behavior or symptomatology,
(4) opinion testimony about the consistency of the victim's behavior or
symptoms with RTS, and (5) opinion testimony that the victim suffers
from RTS.'" The first two categories represent generalized expert
testimony because they permit discussion of victims' responses generally
but forbid explicit references to the complainant, while the remaining
three categories represent particularizedexpert testimony because they
address whether the complainant in the case can be diagnosed as
exhibiting symptoms of RTS.S4
Some states allow an explicit reference to the syndrome, while
others limit references to common symptoms without a reference to the
diagnosis directly. Under the latter framework, courts allow experts to
discuss victim responses as well as expert testimony regarding common
rape-victim responses.' Some suggest that generalized testimony is a
"wise framework" because it allows the expert witness to explain that
what might seem like an unusual response may actually be quite common
for a victimrs6 Moreover, generalized testimony prevents opening the
"door to a potential bias jurors may have against the well-established but

150. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LrrrLEROCK L. REV. 41, 55 (2001).
151. Id.
152. Christopher Emrich, The Playboy Defense in Philadelphia: How Pennsylvania Continues to
Thwart Fairand Effective Sexual Assault Prosecutionsby Refusing to Admit Expert Testimony About
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 891, 893 (2009) (noting that Pennsylvania is the
only state that forbids prosecutors from calling experts to testify regarding a victim's behavior).
153. Karla Fischer, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 713-24.

154. Emrich, supra note 152, at 923.

155. Id. at 923
156. Id. at 918.
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'softer' science of psychology."' Some states, like Arizona, allow an
expert witness to testify about RTS only to aid the factfinder in
determining if there was consent, not in the determination of whether a
rape occurred."' "The expert is also prevented from testifying specifically
about the complainant, essentially leaving the jury to decide whether
such a diagnosis is appropriate."'
Like SBS and RTS evidence, fire investigators in arson cases
historically searched for and testified about physical evidence they
considered to be conclusive indications of intentional fires. Evidence of
concrete spalling, for example, was introduced at trial as decisive
evidence that a fire was started by incendiary means.' In addition, the
discovery of "crazed glass" was relied upon to indicate the existence of
"a fast spreading fire. "r61
While the remnants of a fire may provide important and relevant
clues regarding the possibility of an incendiary origin, the science
underlying arson prosecution has been criticized. For example, the first
edition of the National Fire Protections Association's ("NFPA") Guide
for Fire and Explosion Investigations was published in 1992 and has since
been revised multiple times, most recently in 2oo8.6' Between 1998 and
2001, numerous proposals to change the guidelines for fire investigation
were submitted. 3' The publication highlights tension between "old
guard" fire investigators, who are confident in their reliance on
experience and instinct to make causal conclusions, and newer
proponents of the scientific method. 6 4 For the most part, science has
prevailed: the Guide has been revised in substance and format to reflect
the scientific method, and define and demand deductive and inductive
157. Id.

158. Id. at 918-19. There is an inherent problem in this distinction, given that a necessary element
in the definition of rape is lack of consent.
159. Id.
16o. 5 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 159. Spalling concrete is concrete that breaks up, flakes,

or becomes pitted. Id. at 236. This can be caused by exposure to high temperatures as well as the
natural process of weathering, corrosion, continual friction, or a direct impact with another object. Id
161. Id. at i59-6o. Crazed glass, a spider web-like pattern in glass, has been described in forensic
textbooks as a key indicator that a fire had burned "fast and hot," meaning that it had been fuelled by
a liquid accelerant, causing the glass to fracture. Id. at 235-36.
Older reports demonstrate that nonscientific data was relied upon to demonstrate the origin of
intentional fires. See, e.g., RAYMOND L. STRAETER & C.C. CRAWFORD, TECHNIQUES OF ARSON
INVESTIGATION 110-13 (1955). For example, Straeter and Crawford's practice guide instructs fire

investigators on identifying "female arsonists." Id. at Ito. The publication includes a section titled,
"How to discover whether a female caused the fire," explaining: "[the] fairly recognizable traits or
techniques in common [among female fire starters] ... [are that they] tend to be a bit 'childish,' 'silly,'
hasty, poorly planned ... [and are] often spur-of-the-moment, impulsive, and ill-considered jobs." Id.
at Iio-Ii. While these assumptions are no longer controlling, they illustrate the tremendous shift in
understanding that has taken place the last fifty years despite remaining controversies.
162. NFPA, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR EXPLOSION AND FIRE INVESTIGATIONS (2oo8).

163. 5 FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 142, at 220.
164. Id. at 220-21.
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reasoning. 6 5 The guidelines state specifically that "[t]he systematic
approach recommended [for a fire investigation] is that of the scientific
method, which is used in the physical sciences."'6 In addition, there has
been a rise in Daubert challenges to fire investigators who do not follow
the NFPA recommendations, and the Daubert rulings often cite directly
to the NFPA.'6 Given that arson is neither a physical nor psychological
condition, factors do not exist to "diagnose" a fire.'" Instead, fire
investigators rely on a range of "indicators" that are interpreted by
experts. In a fire investigation, the effect is known (a fire) and science is
offered in court to demonstrate the cause of that effect (an accidental or
incendiary source).'6 These techniques and indicators, however, "have
long been plagued by 'ill-defined, flexible, and explicitly subjective
criterion' based upon unproven assumptions, exaggerated claims, and
deficient research, testing, and measuring techniques."'
Limiting
evidence would severely restrain the prosecution's ability to build its
case, but allowing testimony regarding fire indicators runs the risk of
allowing the admission of "junk science."'
In both rape and arson prosecutions, available evidence is relevant
to the event in question, yet much of the evidence should be limited to
social science frameworks in order to prevent experts from making
unsupportable causal deductions. Whether in the form of an
epidemiological study or an expert's testimony about past experience,
testimony can inform the judge or jury as to the current understanding in
the relevant field, but it should not be used by experts to make
inappropriate causal deductions.

C. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

AND GENDER STEREOTYPING

Eyewitness identification provides a paradigmatic model for the use
of social frameworks evidence at trial, because it has come under scrutiny
in the recent years due to the use of DNA evidence to exonerate
individuals convicted primarily due to eyewitness testimony."'

165. Id. at 221.
166. NFPA, supra note 162, at 18.
167. 5 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 222. According to Faigman, "[i]t is the misinterpretation

of fire effects and fire patterns (as opposed to incorrect procedures) that account for most of the
incorrect determinations of fire origins and cases." Id.
168. Id. at 235.
169. Faigman, supra note 78, at 1122.
170. Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit:
Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 20Io, at I, 2
(quoting EDWARD

J.

IMWINKELREID, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 204 (4th ed.

2004)); see also David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject Lessons from
the History of Science, 59 HASTINGs L.J. 979,979-80 (2008).
171. See May, supra note 170, at 2 n.7.

172. CBS News Eyewitness: How Accurate Is Visual Memory? (television broadcast Mar. 8, 2oo9).
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Most experts at trial are utilized to explain the problems associated
with eyewitness identification. For example, researchers have concluded
that certain factors, including cross-racial identifications, the presence of
a weapon, or use of leading questions by interviewers can undermine the
accuracy of identifications.' 3 Given that few contest the existence of
these types of cognitive biases, the core question regarding eyewitness
identification testimony is not whether the testimony is scientifically
accurate, but whether an expert witness will indeed assist the trier of fact
at trial. Some critics argue that a judge or jury may be able to evaluate
the accuracy of eyewitness identifications without the help of an expert.'74
Regardless, experts have been utilized frequently to explain some of the
problems inherent in eyewitness testimony.'
Eyewitness identification, in essence, provides a "mirror image"
example of the dilemma of causal expert testimony discussed above.
Unlike SBS, where the effect is known and the cause is of unknown
origin, in eyewitness identification "the causal side of the equation is the
independent variable, which is more or less known or assumed to be
present in the case. The focus, therefore, is principally on what effect this
causal variable has had.""' In such cases, courts have followed a pattern
whereby expert testimony is admitted as evidence in an effort to provide
a social framework for the phenomenon in question. Experts share
sociological or psychological studies with the factfinders without making
causal conclusions as to whether the eyewitness identification was
contaminated by an intervening variable. Specific causation cannot be
demonstrated with a high degree of accuracy, given that studies
demonstrate that eyewitness testimony often yields inaccurate results.
Yet even with these epidemiological studies, it is almost impossible to
demonstrate whether in a given instance a particular witness
misidentified another individual.
In People v. Mooney, for example, the judge reflected upon the
usefulness of social frameworks, explaining that courts have repeatedly
upheld admission of expert testimony to clarify an area in which jurors
have general, but not detailed understanding.15 Similarly, the judge in

173. Faigman, supra note 78, at 1122.

174. See generally Christian Sheehan, Making the Jurors the "Experts": The Case for Eyewitness
Identification Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651 (2011).
175. See 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 497.
176. Faigman, supra note 78, at 122 ("Hence, if the witness is white and the perpetrator is black,

the empirical crux of the matter concerns what effect this causal variable has on the accuracy of the
identification.").
177. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age ofDNA Profiling,67 BROOK. L.
REV. 13, 17 (2001). "[E]yewitness testimony [is] a notoriously unreliable form of evidence. People are
all distinct from one another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate of eyewitness
identification is zero, though in practice observers may frequently make errors." Id. at 6o.
178. People v. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (N.Y. 1990).
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United States v. Hines explained her view regarding the educational use
of expert testimony:
Nor do I agree that this testimony somehow usurps the function of
the jury. The function of the expert here is not to say to the jury-"you
should believe or not believe the eyewitness." . .. All that the expert
does is provide the jury with more information with which the jury can
then make a more informed decision. And only the expert can do so.
In the absence of an expert, a defense lawyer, for example, may try to
argue that cross racial identifications are more problematic than
identifications between members of the same race, or that stress may
undermine accuracy, but his voice necessarily lacks the authority of the
scientific studies [the defendant's expert] cited."'

Courts have debated the usefulness of testimony about factors that
generally interfere with eyewitness accuracy, versus testimony about the
witness in question. Although some courts claim that experts unfamiliar
with the specific facts of the case would not be useful, other courts
disagree, stating that the generality of the expert's statements are less
invasive of the jury's province.'" When presenting social framework
evidence on eyewitness identification, Monahan and Walker argue that
"the expert can testify on general research that cross-racial identification
is, on average, worse than same-race identification.""' However, it would
not be appropriate for the expert to testify that the Earticular witness
misidentified a particular defendant of a different race.' Indeed,
Testimony of this kind would improperly treat findings drawn from
aggregate data as if they revealed constant effects across individuals
and settings, and would ignore the potential confounding and

moderating variables that were statistically or experimentally
controlled in the research settings but that could not be controlled in
the specific case where the behavior in question occurred."'

Like eyewitness identification, Faigman argues that the primary
value of work on gender stereotyping is to educate the factfinder
regarding the nature of the phenomenon, rather than to offer an opinion
about the specific case, defendant, or witness before the court.' The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. provides a
relevant, although undoubtedly controversial, example of social
frameworks evidence at the trial level.'58 In the class action suit alleging
179. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62,72 (D. Mass 1999).
i8o. See 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 495-96.

181. Monahan et al., supra note 122, at 1734-35.
182. Id. at 1735.
183. Id. at 1735-36 (footnote omitted).
184. See, e.g., Hnot v. Willis Grp. Holdings Ltd., No. oi CIV 6558 GEL., 2007 WL 1599154, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June I, 2007) ("Such testimony can be valuable in giving a jury context within which to
evaluate the particular evidence relating to the workplaces at issue here.").
185. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (U.S. June 20, 201). The Ninth's Circuit's discussion remains relevant despite
the Supreme Court's reversal.
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that Wal-Mart engaged in a long-term pattern of gender discrimination,
the plaintiffs presented evidence from Dr. William Bielby, a sociologist,
to interpret and explain facts suggesting that Wal-Mart had a corporate
culture that included gender stereotyping.'" In his expert report, Bielby
explicitly stated that he was utilizing social frameworks evidence:
I have also relied upon a large body of social research on
organizational policy and practice and on workplace bias. Social
research conducted across many decades has generated considerable
knowledge about what generates and sustains workplace inequalities.
That same research, either directly or by implication, points to the
kinds of workplace policies and practices that are likely to minimize
bias.... Thus, the scientific evidence about gender bias, stereotypes,
and the structure and dynamics of gender inequality in organizations
that I rely upon has substantial external validity and provides a sound
basis for analyzing the policies and practices of Wal-Mart. My method
is to look at distinctive features of the firm's policies and practices and
to evaluate them against what social science research shows to be
factors that create and sustain bias and those that minimize bias. In
litigation contexts, this method of analysis is known as "social
framework analysis." 8 ,
Interestingly, Monahan and Walker, who stress the importance and
usefulness of social frameworks evidence, have critiqued the method by
which Bielby used social science evidence at trial and argue that he made
improper causal statements connecting general findings to the specific
case at hand.'" They note that "Dr. Bielby .. . opined that Wal-Mart's
employment practices 'contribute to disparities between men and women
in their compensation and career trajectories at the company."1
Therefore, they argue, Bielby did much more than make "general
assessments" about discrimination in the workplace." Indeed, Monahan
and Walker state further that Bielby "opined that gender was a causal
factor in some unspecified percentage of all personnel decisions at all
Wal-Mart facilities across the USA for all of the class period, without
testing for the effect of candidate gender on any specific personnel
decision.".
186. Expert Report of William T. Bielby, Ph.D., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137
(N.D. Cal. 2004), available at http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/reports/r3.html (last visited July
4,2011).

187. Id. at 3.
188. John Monahan et al., The Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 8 L. PROBABILrrY & RISK 307
(2o9).
189. Id. (citing Bielby, supra note 186, at 25) (emphasis omitted).
19o. Monahan et al., supra note 188, at 312.
191. Id. Monahan argues that expert witnesses should be permitted to link general research

findings to the facts of a specific case: "Of course, this does not mean that the social framework expert
can necessarily offer any expert judgment about specific causation; the question of whether
discrimination in fact led to the denial of specific promotions of women at Wal-Mart, for example, is
one that will ultimately be answered by the fact finder.... [T]he risk presented by testimony from a
social scientist on the specific causation question is that the assessment that is called for may well fall
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Despite these criticisms, it is apparent that social frameworks have
been useful in a range of litigation contexts. Building upon the
application of social frameworks in areas such as eyewitness testimony,
lawyers will progress in their ability to successfully and equitably try SBS
cases.
CONCLUSION
The problem of SBS places the courts at an important crossroads. If
evidence exists that is relevant at trial, but runs the risk of misinforming
the judge or jury as to its specific causal relevance, courts must adopt
rules that limit expert testimony to that of social frameworks. This
paradigm is of particular importance as courts attempt to balance the
need to convict individuals guilty of crimes such as child abuse with the
need to protect the innocent.
It is useful to place SBS within a broader evidentiary context and
evaluate scientific and social science phenomena that share some of the
unique characteristics of SBS. The areas of rape and arson discussed here
can provide a starting point to inspire the continued exploration social
frameworks evidence in the courtroom.
Science continues to advance, and we may indeed reach a point in
the future when we can prove phenomena like SBS with specific
causation testimony. Yet we must be careful not to attempt to do so until
we can establish more accurate diagnostic criteria.' To bridge that gap,
there exists a special set of circumstances where evidence is worthy of
admission if limited to a general social science context.

outside of the proffered expert's field of expertise. What the social framework expert is doing is
looking at the policies and practices operating in a workplace more generally and identifying the ways
in which they may limit or permit operation of stereotype and bias. To say that some forms of
'linkage'-the link to specific causation-are beyond the scope of a social scientist's expertise is very
different from saying that a social scientist is engaging in impermissible 'linkage' whenever he or she
evaluates specific workplace policies and practices in light of current social science literature." Id.
(quoting Melissa Hart & Paul Segunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment DiscriminationClass Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 55 (2009))).
192. For example, Matshes is now working on a study that will examine whether infants with
subdural and retinal hemorrhaging might have certain neck injuries that have gone undetected. See
Bazelon, supra note ii, at 36. Matshes and his team are conducting autopsies of the entire cervical
spinal column, an area not usually examined in SBS cases. Id. He hopes that this might help identify an
additional diagnosis tool to help distinguish which babies have actually been abused versus those that
may have subdural and retinal bleeding from other causes. Id. at 36-37.

